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Dramatic increases in reports of child abuse and an even more
alarming rise in reports of sexual abuse of children1 have contributed to
growing media attention and public awareness of these problems.2 Con-
cern for effective prosecution of the abusers, as well as for protection of
the minor victims from further psychological trauma,3 has prompted a
growing number of states to develop statutory measures that provide
special protection from trauma for children during testimony at trial.4
The minor victim reportedly has the most difficulty facing his or her
family and the defendant during testimony.5 Creative solutions' to this
problem have been developed while balancing protection of the defend-
ant's constitutional right to confrontation.7 Typically, these statutes
provide for the child to testify via closed-circuit television, by means of
videotaped direct testimony, or from behind a screen.8
Such procedures have been deemed necessary by state legislatures
primarily for two reasons. First, the state has a strong interest in crimi-
nal justice; conviction rates for juvenile sex abuse cases remain "strik-
ingly low" while reports of abuse continue to escalate annually.9 Low
1. See Brief for the American Bar Association, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988) (No. 86-
6757) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]; see also AM. Ass'N. FOR PROTECTING CHILDREN, HIGHLIGHTS OF
OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING 1985, at 3 (1987) (stating that reports of child
abuse increased from an annual rate of 669,000 in 1976 to over 1.9 million in 1985, and that in
1985, 12% of all reported maltreatment concerned child sexual abuse).
2. See Watson, Special Report: A Hidden Epidemic, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 1984, at 30, col. 3
(quoting statistics which predict that child molestation will occur this year between 100,000 and
500,000 times); Recent Development, Criminal Law-Right of Confrontation-Screen Used at
Trial That Prevents Testifying Child Sex Abuse Victim from Viewing Accused Violates Ac-
cused's Sixth Amendment Right to Face-to-Face Confrontation, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 219, 220
(1988); see also Vartabedian & Vartabedian, Striking a Delicate Balance, JUDGES J., Fall 1985, at
16, 17.
3. See Casenote, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie: The Supreme Court Examines Confrontation and
Due Process in Child Abuse Cases, 34 Loy. L. Ray. 181, 186 (1988) (stating that "[1less than ten
percent of the cases reported in any year are ever prosecuted because of the difficulty in obtaining
evidence and the trauma to the child caused by the criminal justice system").
4. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. The policy underlying these "child shield" stat-
utes is to provide an atmosphere as comfortable and unthreatening as possible in which the child
may testify, while still allowing the defendant to participate fully in the proceeding.
5. See, e.g., Ginkowski, The Abused Child: The Prosecutor's Terrifying Nightmare, CRIM.
JUST., Spring 1986, at 30, 31; Vartabedian & Vartabedian, supra note 2, at 18.
6. Ginkowski, supra note 5, at 35.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
8. See Ginkowski, supra note 5, at 35.
9. See Note, The Revision of Article 38.071 after Long v. State: The Troubles of a Child
Shield Law in Texas, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 267 (1988). Many authorities, however, do not believe
that the current number of sexual abuse reports accurately reflects the amount of abuse that is
actually occurring. See, e.g., Comment, Children's Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases: Ohio's Pro-
posed Legislation, 19 AKRON L. Rv. 441, 441 n.5 (1986) (reporting that "'[i]t is likely that more
than 20,000 felony child molestations occur in Ohio each year: [and that] 2,000 (10%) of these
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rates of conviction have been noted by courts and psychologists as due
in large part to the child's reluctance or inability to testify in open
court.'0 If the child is psychologically able to testify at all, the quality of
that testimony may weaken the state's case dramatically." The witness
is better able to testify effectively and accurately when a court is au-
thorized statutorily to permit these children to testify in unorthodox
manners that shield the child from the trauma of testifying face-to-face
with the defendant. 2
In addition to facilitating prosecution and conviction, the state has
a strong social interest in protecting the psychological welfare of minors
who are victims of sexual abuse. Virtually all commentators, judges,
prosecutors, and support professionals who deal with child victims ac-
knowledge that the pre-existing trauma of the abuse is only exacer-
bated 13 by the emotional demands put upon the child during testimony
at trial.14 Feelings of guilt, fear, and isolation are among the most com-
offenses are reported to law enforcement authorities'" (quoting Ohio State Sen. Lee Fisher, spon-
sor of OHIO S. 16 (Jan. 30, 1985) (proposed child shield legislation))).
10. See State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (Law Div. 1984). There, the
state's case-in-chief disclosed:
In most cases, prosecutions are abandoned or result in generous plea agreements, either be-
cause the child's emotional condition prevents [him or] her from testifying or makes the testi-
mony obviously inaccurate or inadequate. One attorney, who had handled 30 to 40 of these
cases for the State, was able to complete a trial in only one. In most, while the child victim
was able to provide her with information sufficient to support a prosecution and was some-
times able to appear with difficulty before a grand jury, [he or] she could not testify in court
face-to-face with the accused and other relatives.
Id. at 417, 484 A.2d at 1333.
11. See D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR
JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 17-18 (1985) [hereinafter CHILD VICTIM ISSUES] (noting that "the most
frequently mentioned fear was facing the defendant [as] the participation and experience of being
in close proximity to the defendant can be overwhelming").
12. The ABA's amicus curiae brief submitted in Coy v. Iowa argued:
Testifying in sight of the defendant may. . . weaken the state's case. The trauma may
contribute to the child "freezing" on the witness stand, fidgeting, stammering, and in general
casting false doubt upon his or her credibility and veracity. If the child is unable to testify
effectively, the case may be dismissed.
Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 9-10.
13. See, e.g., Ginkowski, supra note 5, at 31 (stating that "[i]ronically, the criminal justice
system, supposedly the child protector of last resort, often becomes the perpetrator of child
abuse").
14. See Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Jus-
tice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977 (1969). Libai discussed the following elements that adversely
affect child witnesses:
Psychiatrists have identified components of the legal proceedings that are capable of putting
a child victim under prolonged mental stress and endangering his emotional equilibrium: re-
peated interrogations . . . ; facing the accused again; the official atmosphere in court; the
acquittal of the accused for want of corroborating evidence . . . ; and the conviction of a
molester who is the child's parent or relative.
Id. at 984; see also Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 8-9; Vartabedian & Vartabedian, supra note 2,
at 18; Note, supra note 9, at 268.
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mon emotions experienced by these witnesses. Moreover, the alleged
abuser is very often a family member, which adds a sense of betrayal."5
Attempts to help ease such trauma have led to efforts to alleviate
the primary cause of the feelings-the child being forced to look at the
defendant while testifying. 16 In response to public outcry state legisla-
tures have enacted various forms of "child shield" statutes and the
American Bar Association (ABA) has approved guidelines for treatment
of child abuse victims during testimony.17 The ABA guidelines include
procedural reforms that allow the child to testify from a different loca-
tion than that normally reserved for witnesses.' 8
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court'9 the Court recognized
the protection of child sexual assault victims during trial as a "compel-
ling" state interest, sufficient to warrant alteration of usual trial proce-
dure. The Globe Court weighed the press's first amendment right to
attend trials against the state's interest in "protect[ing] . . .minor vic-
tims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment . . . [and
encouraging] such victims to come forward and testify. '2 0 Ultimately,
the Court found that "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-
being of a minor" is a compelling interest."' Thus, until very recently,
the trend in both legislative action and judicial decisions was to extend
the greatest protection possible to children who are required to testify
regarding sexual abuse.
In Coy v. Iowa,22 however, the Supreme Court struck down a stat-
ute that permitted minor witnesses to testify from behind a one-way
screen. The statute was held to violate a defendant's confrontation
rights.2 3 Although limiting its decision to the statute at hand, the
Court's interpretation of the confrontation clause raised uncertainties
about the future of many child shield statutes.
This Recent Development considers whether the Court's analysis of
the confrontation clause in Coy v. Iowa was justified in light of past
decisions and whether it will be beneficial for the prosecution of child
sexual abuse cases. Part II examines the development of confrontation
15. See Vartabedian & Vartabedian, supra note 2, at 18.
16. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 75 and accompanying text; see also A.B.A., GUIDELINES FOR THE FAIR
TREATMENT OF CHILD WITNESSES IN CASES WHERE CHILD ABUSE IS ALLEGED (adopted July 10, 1985,
by the ABA House of Delegates in Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter CHILD WITNESS GUIDELINES].
18. CHILD WITNESS GUIDELINES, supra note 17. Among the ABA's suggestions for alternative
modes of testimony are closed-circuit television and a one-way mirror. Id.
19. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
20. Id. at 607; see also Casenote, supra note 3, at 187.
21. Globe, 457 U.S. at 607.
22. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
23. Id. at 2802.
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clause interpretation, including its purpose and application. Part III ex-
plores recent cases and child shield statutes that apply well-developed
law to the problem of child abuse. In particular, it examines Coy v.
Iowa against the background of cases dealing with similar confrontation
issues. Part IV concludes that the decision in Coy was not justified by
existing case law and that some child shield statutes may now be in
danger of being held unconstitutional. Finally, Part V outlines ways in
which future legislation might protect child victims of sexual abuse and
still meet the Court's criteria for confrontation.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Historical Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause
1. The "Truthfinding" Function
In all criminal trials the sixth amendment gives the defendant "the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The pur-
pose of the amendment is to compel each witness to testify in the pres-
ence of the jury so that the jurors may evaluate his demeanor on the
stand.2'
Even the United States Supreme Court, however, acknowledges
that the intent of the drafters of the Bill of Rights is unclear. 5 Conse-
quently, an early judicial decision, Mattox v. United States,2 has be-
come the foundation for interpreting the confrontation clause. The
Court in Mattox held that the primary objectives of the confrontation
clause are to allow the defendant to challenge the witness's conscience
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right is binding upon the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (holding that the
right to confrontation is fundamental and essential to a fair trial and is made obligatory on the
states by the fourteenth amendment).
25. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175-76 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan noted:
Similar guarantees to those of the Sixth Amendment are found in a number of the colonial
constitutions and it appears to have been assumed that a confrontation provision would be
included in the Bill of Rights that was to be added to the Constitution after ratification. The
Congressmen who drafted the Bill of Rights amendments were primarily concerned with the
political consequences of the new clauses and paid scant attention to the definition and mean-
ing of particular guarantees. Thus, the confrontation clause was apparently included without
debate along with the rest of the Sixth Amendment package of rights . . . .If anything, the
confrontation guarantee may be thought, along with the right to compulsory process, merely
to constitutionalize the right to a defense as we know it, a right not always enjoyed by the
accused, whose only defense prior to the late 17th century was to argue that the prosecution
had not completely proved its case.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Comment, "Face-to Television Screen-to Face": Testimony by
Closed-Circuit Television in Cases of Alleged Child Abuse and the Confrontation Right, 76 KY.
L.J. 273, 279 (1988).
26. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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and recollection and to compel the witness to stand before the jury in
order to judge his demeanor and credibility.2 7 The Court also noted
that while face-to-face confrontation is preferred, that right is not abso-
lute and must occasionally yield to public policy and the necessities of a
given case. 8
Since Mattox, the Court has consistently refused to classify con-
frontation rights as absolute29 and has recently held that adverse state
interests may justify dispensing with confrontation at trial.30 In spite of
these exceptions, however, the Court has scrupulously guarded the de-
fendant's right to confrontation and has said that its unjust denial con-
stitutes severe constitutional error.3' Under the current standard for
modifying a defendant's right to confront witnesses, the court balances
public policy considerations against the state's need to operate an effec-
tive criminal justice system.3 2 Proponents of child shield statutes argue
that such public policy considerations are invoked by the state's inter-
est in prosecution of sexual abuse cases. Therefore, the objectives of the
confrontation clause may be preserved while protecting child witnesses
and facilitating prosecutions.3
The primary functions of the confrontation clause traditionally
have been delineated as: (1) ensuring reliability by requiring the witness
to give his or her statements under oath; (2) forcing the witness to sub-
mit to cross-examination in order to discover the truth; and (3) permit-
ting the jury to observe the witness's demeanor to aid in assessing
credibility.3 4 In view of these purposes the Court has characterized the
right to confrontation as a "functional" truth-finding device that pro-
motes reliability of testimony.35 The courts consistently have empha-
27. Id. at 242-43 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 243. It has been observed that with confrontation issues, the Court "departs from
its usual course of examination to determine whether the infringement of this right. . . is based
on a compelling State interest. Instead, cases arising under the confrontation clause are treated as
evidentiary questions." Comment, supra note 9, at 443.
29. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407; Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325 (1911).
30. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
31. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).
32. See Recent Development, supra note 2, at 222 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56).
33. See, e.g., Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 14.
34. Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
35. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987); see also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540
(1986) (holding that the right to confrontation was violated when a defendant was not allowed to
cross-examine a co-defendant regarding his confession). The Court has consistently held that "the
Confrontation Clause guarantees only 'an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.'"
Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739 (emphasis in original) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20
(1985)).
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sized cross-examination as central to the process of determining the
truth and promoting reliability at trial. Indeed, leading cases have held
that satisfaction of the right to confrontation turns solely on the oppor-
tunity for cross-examination."6
When the issue has involved a child testifying about sexual abuse,
however, a few courts have held that face-to-face confrontation, rather
than mere cross-examination, is required because of a perceived in-
creased chance for unreliable testimony.3 7 The majority of cases, none-
theless, have emphasized that confrontation is accomplished through
cross-examination and does not require "eyeball-to-eyeball" contact.3 8
Until Coy, child shield statutes that allowed complete and effective
cross-examination of the witness generally were held constitutional in
spite of the fact that there was no face-to-face confrontation.,9 The
holdings in such cases were based on the fact that cross-examination
ensured sufficient reliability to fulfill the guarantees of the confronta-
tion clause.40
2. "Adequate Indicia of Reliability" as a Measuring Rod
In cases when the opportunity to cross-examine a witness is not
available to the defendant, the Supreme Court still has admitted such
testimony. Normally, the admission is conditioned on both a showing of
36. See, e.g., Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739; see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974)
(requiring that the defendant be allowed to cross-examine the prosecution's witness in order to
impeach testimony); Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407 (holding that admitting into evidence a statement of
the declarant whom the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine violated the confrontation
right); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1965) (holding that the refusal to allow the
defendant to cross-examine the codefendant violated the confrontation clause). See generally Re-
cent Development, supra note 2, at 223.
37. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct at 2798, 2902 (1988).
38. State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 432, 484 A.2d 1330, 1343 (Law Div. 1984); see
also Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739 (holding that the functional purpose of the right to confrontation is to
ensure an opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses); Douglas, 380 U.S. at 418-19 (stating
that the confrontation clause is satisfied by an adequate opportunity for cross-examination); Com-
monwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361, 365, 531 A.2d 459, 461 (1987) (asserting that the right of
confrontation is satisfied when the witness is subject to cross-examination), appeal granted, 518
Pa. 617, 541 A.2d 744 (1988); cf. Note, supra note 9, at 272 (noting that advocates of child shield
statutes contend that the right to confrontation guarantees more than face-to-face confrontation).
39. See, e.g., Stincer, 482 U.S. at 730-31; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); In re
Appeal in Pinal County Juvenile Action, 147 Ariz. 302, 709 P.2d 1361 (1985); McGuire v. State, 288
Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986); Sheppard,
197 N.J. Super. at 411, 484 A.2d at 1330; Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. at 361, 531 A.2d at 459; State v.
Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987). Contra United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th
Cir. 1979) (holding that the confrontation right was violated when the defendant was not allowed
to "fully participate" in cross-examination and when the witness was unaware of his presence);
Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981) (holding that the con-
frontation right was violated when the defendant was able to hear, but not to see the witness).
40. E.g., Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739.
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the witness's unavailability and adequate indicia of reliability regarding
the testimony that will not be subject to cross-examination.41
In Ohio v. Roberts, however, the Court indicated that while the
confrontation clause requires a showing of unavailability, competing
state interests such as "'public policy and the necessities of the case'"
may allow the elimination of confrontation without proof of unavaila-
bility or reliability.42 More importantly for child sexual abuse cases, the
Court indicated that when the utility of confrontation is remote, the
demonstration of unavailability is not required.43 This view has been
reiterated in recent Supreme Court cases. For example, in construing
the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the Court in United
States v. Inadi44 noted that the confrontation clause does not always
require a showing of the declarant's unavailability.
45
Once the first prong of the Roberts test is met through a demon-
stration of unavailability or an adequate showing of reasons to waive
that requirement, the Court also requires proof of adequate indicia of
reliability to admit the testimony.46 The test for reliability can be met
in one of two ways. Reliability is inferred when the "evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. ' 47 In other cases, the Court
requires a "showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" for
the admission of the evidence.48
This ultimate emphasis on reliability as fulfilling the purpose of
the confrontation clause has been affirmed in subsequent cases constru-
ing violations of the right to confrontation.49 In Inadi50 and Bourjaily v.
United States51 the Court admitted evidence that fell within a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception" without requiring separate showings of un-
availability or reliability. The Court noted that the "'hearsay rules and
the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar val-
41. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
42. Id. at 64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
43. Id. at 65 n.7 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (holding that the prosecution
was not required to produce a seemingly available witness when the utility of confrontation
seemed remote)).
44. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
45. Id. at 387. See generally Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and
Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REv. 523, 551-54
(1988).
46. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65; see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
47. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
48. Id.
49. See generally Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment,
35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 559-60 (1988).
50. 475 U.S. at 387.
51. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
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ues.' ,,52 Thus, when statements fall within a hearsay exception, the con-
frontation clause does not require an independent inquiry into their
reliability.
53
In determining the level of confrontation required to preserve a de-
fendant's rights in sexual abuse cases, the Court has held that reliabil-
ity is the primary interest secured by the sixth amendment. In
Kentucky v. Stincer54 the defendant was excluded from the competency
hearing of two child witnesses.55 The Court held that the defendant's
right to confrontation was not violated, stressing that the purpose of
confrontation was to promote reliability.56 These cases indicate that the
Court is willing to find, in the face of reliable evidence, that the con-
frontation clause is not necessarily breached if a defendant is unable to
confront every witness against him.5
Conversely, in cases outside valid hearsay exceptions, the Court re-
quires adequate guarantees of reliability to satisfy the right to confron-
tation. In Lee v. Illinois5" the defendant's rights were held to have been
violated when a nontestifying codefendant's statement did not bear ad-
equate indicia of reliability.59 The Court unanimously agreed that to
satisfy the confrontation clause, hearsay must have certain guarantees
of trustworthiness.6 It did not, however, rule out the possibility that
guarantees of trustworthiness could exist in situations outside a valid
hearsay exception.
B. The Confrontation Clause Applied to the Federal Rules of
Evidence
In addition to the reliability test, Roberts established a require-
ment of unavailability. Some commentators, however, believe that this
condition has been virtually eliminated by Inadi,6' and that the only
52. Id. at 182-83 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970)).
53. Id. at 183.
54. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
55. Id. at 735.
56. See id. at 736-37.
57. See Greenhalgh & Lobelson, Tacking to the Right: Confrontation, Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clauses Re-Examined, A.B-A. J., Jan. 1, 1988, at 35, col. 3 (noting that the Court is
willing to find that an available declarant need not testify, even when the evidence admitted under
the "reliability" test is the pivotal factor resulting in conviction); see also Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at
171; Stincer, 482 U.S. at 730; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); Inadi, 475 U.S. at 387.
58. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
59. A year later, however, in Bourjaily, the Court included the co-conspirator exception
among those "firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that.., a court need not independently
inquire into the reliability of such statements." Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183.
60. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 530; see also Jonakait, supra note 49, at 560.
61. 475 U.S. at 387. Inadi held that statements of nontestifying co-conspirators can be ad-
mitted without a showing of unavailability. If applied to other hearsay areas, this reasoning implies
15191989]
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remaining requirement of unavailability is found in the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 2
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) provides five grounds of unavaila-
bility for a witness: privilege; refusal to testify; testimony to lack of
memory; death or then existing physical or mental infirmity; and pres-
ence not procurable by process or other reasonable means.6 3 When one
of these unavailability criterion is met, Rule 804 provides a hearsay ex-
ception under which the testimony of the unavailable declarant is ad-
missible. The rule's use of "unavailable" refers to the availability of
testimony, not to the witness's physical presence at trial.6 4 Thus, in sex-
ual abuse prosecutions, use of a minor witness's testimony when there is
no confrontation would be allowed under Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a) on the grounds of unavailability, incompetence, and the danger
of severe psychological injury to the child. 5
Proponents of child shield statutes generally emphasize psychologi-
cal unavailability."6 The statutes themselves 7 usually are conditioned
upon a judicial finding that the child would experience at least some
emotional trauma from testifying in open court.68 While many commen-
tators and some courts have implied that this standard is insufficient to
meet constitutional guarantees of confrontation,6 9 the cases upholding
the statutes have done so primarily because of concerns for psychologi-
cal injury to the witness.
70
In applying the Federal Rules of Evidence to the reliability re-
quirement in Roberts, the opinions in Lee, Inadi, and Bourjaily reaf-
that "out-of-court statements generally can be constitutionally introduced without producing an
available declarant." Jonakait, supra note 49, at 561.
62. See Jonakait, supra note 49, at 564, 573.
63. FED. R. EVID. 804(a). Note that the witness is not unavailable within the meaning of the
rule if any of these conditions are due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his
statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying. Id.
64. See Graham, supra note 45, at 554.
65. Id.
66. See generally Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 17-19; CHILD VICTIM ISSUES, supra note 11,
at 16; Vartabedian & Vartabedian, supra note 2, at 48.
67. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
68. Id.; see also Graham, supra note 45, at 559.
69. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct 2798 (1988) (upholding a defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation but not ruling that all child shield statutes are unconstitutional); United States v.
Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding unconstitutional the inability of the defendant to
participate fully in a videotaped deposition); Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777,
208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984) (rejecting "shield" procedures because the trial court had implemented
them before they had been passed by the legislature). See generally Graham, supra note 45;
Jonakait, supra note 49.
70. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39
(1987); State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259, 394 P.2d 196, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 949 (1964); State v.
Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985); State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330
(Law Div. 1984); State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982).
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firmed the rule that no showing of reliability is required if the evidence
falls within a firmly established hearsay exception. Moreover, the Rob-
erts Court held that statements not within a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception still satisfy constitutional requirements for admissibility if they
exhibit "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."71 This language
is analogous to the rationale supporting residual hearsay exceptions."
Consequently, evidence admitted under those exceptions seems to meet
the reliability requirements of the confrontation clause. 73 Many statu-
tory provisions for child sexual abuse prosecutions use similar language
in an effort to create hearsay exceptions that protect the minor witness
and the defendant."
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. "Child Shield" Statutes
Based on the United States Supreme Court's indications that un-
availability and sufficient indicia of reliability satisfy the elements of
confrontation, a majority of states have sought to protect their "com-
pelling" interests through the adoption of "child shield" statutes.75
71. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
72. See Graham, supra note 45, at 563; see also FED. R. EviD. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
73. See Graham, supra note 45, at 564.
74. Id. at 563; see also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
75. See Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at la-18a. The following 21 statutes provide for video-
taped testimony of a minor witness at the discretion of the trial court. Unless otherwise indicated,
only the attorneys, technicians, and a support person for the minor witness may be in the room.
ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988) (stating that defendant must be present); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-4253 (Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54
(West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1988) (stating that defendant must be present
and proceedings must be televised live to the jury); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (West 1986); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 910.A14 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421-350(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1989);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 1988); MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405
(Supp. 1988); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:84A-32.4 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp.
1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 §§ 5982, 5985 (Purdon Supp. 1989); RlI. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2
(Supp. 1988); Thx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-35-15.5(3) (Supp. 1989); VT. R. Evm. § 807.
The following four statutes provide for simultaneous, live two-way broadcasting of the child's
testimony by means of closed-circuit television. The procedure is at the trial court's discretion.
Unless otherwise indicated, only the attorneys, technicians, and a support person for the minor
witness may be in the room. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 1989); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-
.30 (McKinney Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(c), (e) (Anderson 1987); VT. R. EVID. §
807.
The following 33 statutes provide for use at trial of a child's videotaped deposition or prior
testimony. These procedures are not to be used in lieu of testimony, but are a sufficient substitute
should the court find the minor unavailable for testimony at trial. Unless otherwise indicated, the
defendant must be present and not hidden from the child's view. ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp.
1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); Am. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251, 13-4253(b), (c) (Supp.
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These statutes attempt to facilitate prosecution in child sexual abuse
trials while protecting the minor witnesses. 6
The ABA supports measures for the protection of child witnesses.
As early as 1984 the ABA Criminal Justice Section's Defense and Pros-
ecution Function Committee began a collective project that combined
the advice of its own governing council of professors, defense lawyers,
prosecutors, judges, and others to create Child Witness Guidelines for
sexual abuse cases." Ratified in 1985 by the ABA House of Delegates,
the guidelines offer procedural reforms designed to lessen the trauma to
a testifying child while preserving the defendant's right to confronta-
tion. Included among the recommendations are modifications for the
manner and location of the child's testimony."' In addition, the Child
Witness Guidelines specifically advise that child witnesses should be
able to testify, when necessary, through closed-circuit television, a one-
way mirror, or in any other manner that does not impair the defend-
1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-203 (Supp. 1985). CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West 1989); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1987) (providing
that the court shall ensure the child can neither see nor hear the defendant); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 3511 (1987) (providing that the court may require the defendant to be out of the child's view
by means of a two-way mirror or screen); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8(c), (d), (f), (g) (West 1986);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1986) (providing that
the court shall ensure that the child is unable to hear or see the defendant); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.350(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (providing that the court shall ensure that the child
is unable to hear or see the defendant); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(2) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1989) (providing that the court may arrange for the child not to see or hear the defendant);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 1988) (providing that the defendant may observe and listen
unless it is traumatic to the child); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (Supp. 1988) (providing that the
court may order the defendant placed where the child cannot see or hear the defendant); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 491.675-.690 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (providing that the court may exclude the defendant);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to -403 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.227 (Michie 1986); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.41(A), (B), (D), (E) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) (providing that the court may exclude the
defendant; however, a closed-circuit monitor must be provided so that the defendant is in view
during the deposition); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753(C) (West Supp. 1989) (providing that the
court shall ensure that the child cannot see or hear the defendant); PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§
5982, 5984 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (providing that the court shall ensure that the child cannot see or
hear the defendant); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1988) (providing that the court shall en-
sure that the child cannot see or hear the defendant); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law Co-op.
1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-27-116(d)-(f) (Supp.
1986); TEx. CODE CRIN. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (providing that the court
shall ensure that the child cannot see or hear the defendant); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5(3), (4)
(Supp. 1989) (providing that the court may order the defendant hidden from the child's view); VT.
R. EVID. § 807 (providing that the court may order the defendant placed so that the child cannot
see or hear the defendant); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7)-(10) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT.
§ 7-11-408 (1987) (providing that the court may have the defendant hidden from the child's view).
76. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.




ant's right to confrontation. 9 These guidelines are based on evidence
that as children testify in court with greater frequency as victims, they
find the criminal justice system "alien and discomforting."80 Thus, it is
important that the children, as well as the defendants, receive protec-
tion of their rights.8" The ABA recognizes that in spite of the unavoida-
ble discomfort of testifying, courts and attorneys have the power to
lessen this trauma for child witnesses through modification of
procedures.82
As stipulated in the Child Witness Guidelines, the child shield
statutes make provisions for protection of the defendant's right to con-
frontation. 3 Many statutes require that the child be available to testify
and to be cross-examined at trial, even if the deposition was video-
taped.8 4 Moreover, even those statutes that allow the videotape to sub-
stitute for the child's presence attempt to preserve the constitutionally
required indicia of reliability by insisting that the child be available for
cross-examination, either in court or on videotape.8 5
Child shield laws that permit cross-examination generally have
been found constitutional, in spite of a lack of face-to-face confronta-
tion. 6 In State v. Johnson the Kansas Supreme Court upheld its child
shield law, reasoning that the provisions for cross-examination provided
sufficient indicia of reliability to meet the constitutional requirements
for confrontation.8 7 In addition, the court in Commonwealth v. Lud-
wig88 stressed that the right to confront does not confer the right to
intimidate and noted that the reliability of a child's testimony cannot
79. Id. procedural reform (g).
80. CHILD WITNESS GUIDELINES, supra note 17.
81. See Shepherd, Introduction to CHILD WITNESS GUIDELINES, supra note 17.
82. Id. at 19-22.
83. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 292-94.
84. See Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at la-18a.
85. Id.
86. The following state child shield laws have been held by state courts not to violate the
right to confrontation: Arizona (State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801 (1987)); Florida
(Chambers v. State, 504 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)); Indiana (Miller v. State, 498 N.E.2d
1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 517 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. 1987)); Kansas (State v.
Johnson, 240 Kan. 326, 729 P.2d 1169 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1071 (1987)); Kentucky
(Hardy v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1986)); Louisiana (Louisiana ex rel R.C., Jr., 514
So. 2d 759 (La. Ct. App. 1987)); Maine (State v. Twist, 528 A.2d 1250 (Me. 1987)); Maryland
(Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987)); New Mexico (State v. Tafoya, 105 N.M.
117, 729 P.2d 1371 (Ct. App. 1986)); Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361,
531 A.2d 459 (1987), appeal granted, 518 Pa. 617, 541 A.2d 744 (1988)); South Carolina (State v.
Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987)). Contra Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App.
3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984) (holding that legislative authorization to protect witnesses from
undue embarrassment does not empower a court to order testimony of a minor victim of sexual
molestation via closed-circuit television).
87. Johnson, 240 Kan. at 326, 729 P.2d at 1169; see also Graham, supra note 45, at 576-80.
88. 366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987).
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be measured in terms of how well he or she is able to withstand the
psychological trauma of testifying face-to-face with the defendant. The
court felt that the reliability of the child's testimony was assured
through the child's cross-examination, which allowed the jury and de-
fendant to observe the witness's demeanor. 9
B. Confrontation in Sexual Abuse Cases
1. Kentucky v. Stincer and Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
The theme of cross-examination also has arisen in recent Supreme
Court cases that address the issue of confrontation. In Kentucky v.
Stincer9 ° the defendant claimed that his exclusion from the competency
hearing of two minor victims of sexual abuse violated his right to con-
frontation. The Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause had
not been violated. Noting that a competency hearing generally encom-
passes matters unrelated to basic trial issues, the holding in Stincer
rested predominantly upon the grounds that the primary object of the
confrontation clause is to secure for the defendant the right to cross-
examination.9 1 The Court stressed that the right's primary purpose of
the right to confrontation was to promote reliability,92 not to entitle
defendants to confront witnesses face-to-face. In addition, the Court
stated that the central question was not whether a particular proceed-
ing was critical to the outcome of the trial, but whether there was inter-
ference with the defendant's right to cross-examination. 3
The Court also addressed confrontation in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie,94 in which the defendant, convicted of sexual abuse of a minor,
had been denied the right to see the contents of the witness's Children
and Youth Services file. In approving an in camera inspection of the
file, a plurality held that unlimited access would be counterproductive
to the state's efforts to encourage reports of sexual abuse and to aid
abused children.95 The plurality based this decision on the defendant's
rights under the confrontation clause to face any witness against him
and to cross-examination before a jury.96 The Court emphasized, how-
ever, that the right to effective cross-examination does not include the
right to cross-examination in whatever manner and to whatever extent
89. Id. at 463.
90. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
91. Id. at 737-39.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 744-45 n.17.
94. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
95. Id. at 60.
96. Id. at 54. See generally Casenote, supra note 3, at 191-92.
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the defendant might wish. 7
2. Coy v. Iowa
In light of recent rulings by the current Supreme Court on confron-
tation and state court treatment of child shield statutes,98 commenta-
tors understandably perceived a trend toward judicial protection of
child witnesses and away from a strict reading of the confrontation
clause.99 The Court, however, introduced a radical departure from its
previous course in the recent case of Coy v. Iowa.100
In Coy the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of child
shield statutes for the first time. The defendant had been convicted of
sexually assaulting two minor girls. Under an Iowa shield law,101 the
victims had been allowed to testify at trial from behind a screen. Spe-
cial lighting adjustments had enabled the defendant to see the wit-
nesses. The witnesses could not see the defendant but had been
informed of his presence. In addition, the witnesses had been in full
view of the judge, jury, and defendant's counsel. The defendant claimed
that his right to confrontation had been violated through the lack of
face-to-face confrontation. The Iowa Supreme Court, however, affirmed
the conviction, stating that because the ability to cross-examine the
witness had not been impaired, there had been no violation of the con-
frontation clause.
102
The Court declared the Iowa statute unconstitutional and found
that the confrontation clause does, in fact, guarantee the right to face-
to-face confrontation.1 3 The Court drew upon a number of unconven-
tional sources of authority to reach this conclusion. First, the Court
looked to "the beginnings of Western legal culture" and noted that a
form of the right of confrontation was recognized under both Roman
and ancient English law.104 The Court also examined the Latin roots of
97. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 53 (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985)).
98. See supra notes 86-89, 91-97, and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 285; Casenote, supra note 3, at 196. See generally
Jonakait, supra note 49.
100. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
101. IowA CODE ANN. § 910A.14(1) (West Supp. 1989). The Iowa statute provides in part:
The court may require a party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror
that permits the party to see and hear the child during the child's testimony, but does not
allow the child to see or hear the party. However, if a party is so confined, the court shall take
measures to insure that the party and counsel can confer during the testimony and shall
inform the child that the party can see and hear the child during testimony.
Id.
102. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
103. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800 (citing Stincer, 482 U.S. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
104. Id.
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the word "confront"'10 5 to reach an implication that the word itself con-
notes a literal, face-to-face confrontation. In addition, the Court quoted
Shakespeare's Richard II to describe the root meaning of confronta-
tion.106 Moreover, President Dwight D. Eisenhower is cited as describ-
ing face-to-face confrontation as part of the "code" in his hometown of
Abilene, Kansas.10 7 Finally, the Court pointed out that the phrase,
"'Look me in the eye and say that,'" still persists in our society. 0 8
The Court distinguished previous rulings on the confrontation
clause as involving either the admissibility of out of court statements' 9
or restrictions on the scope of examination. 10 The Court saw none of
the previous readings of the sixth amendment as applicable to the ques-
tion of face-to-face confrontation. While acknowledging that face-to-
face confrontation serves the same purpose as cross-examination,"' the
Court pointed to other cases that described literal confrontation as the
"core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause""' and as
"'essential to a fair trial.' ""s Consequently, the Court concluded that
the constitutional guarantees of reliability in the confrontation clause
demand literal confrontation, despite the psychological "costs" to
witnesses." 4
105. Id. (noting that "confront" derives from the prefix "con-" (from "contra" meaning
"against" or "opposed") and the noun "frons" (forehead)).
106. Id. "'Then call them to our presence-face to face, and frowning brow to brow, our-
selves will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak .... '" Id. (quoting Richard II, Act I,
scene 1).
107. Id. at 2801. President Eisenhower stated:
In Abilene. . .it was necessary to "[m]eet anyone face to face with whom you disagree. You
could not sneak up on him from behind, or do any damage to him, without suffering the
penalty of an outraged citizenry. . . .In this country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you,
he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow."
Id. (quoting President Eisenhower, Remarks given to the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League
(Nov. 23, 1953)).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
110. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974); cf. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (asserting that admission of expert opinion
despite the expert's inability to recall the basis for that opinion did not restrict the scope of coun-
sel's cross-examination).
111. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. "[B]oth 'ensur[e] the integrity of the fact-finding process.'" Id.
(quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987)).
112. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970).
113. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S.
687, 692 (1931)).
114. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. The Court concluded further:
The State can hardly gainsay the profound effect upon a witness of standing in the presence
of the person the witness accuses, since that is the very phenomenon it relies upon to estab-
lish the potential "trauma" that allegedly justified the extraordinary procedure in the present
case. That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused
child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child
1526
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The Court acknowledged past cases holding that confrontation is
not absolute, and may give way to other interests. The Court character-
ized those rights as implicit, however, and not as narrowly drawn as
literal confrontation. 115 The Court acknowledged that some exceptions
to the rule may exist,116 but declined to identify any exceptions and
stated that they would be recognized only to further an important pub-
lic policy.117 Moreover, the Court will require more than a generalized
finding of trauma to justify alternative methods of testimony since such
an exception is not "'firmly ... rooted in our jurisprudence.' ,,38
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Reliability Requirement
Despite the variety of specific findings, all cases construing the con-
frontation clause acknowledge that its primary function is to ensure re-
liability in the truth-finding procedure at trial." 9 The Coy Court
concluded that reliability can be assured only through face-to-face con-
frontation. Most courts disagree, however, with the idea that a fair trial
can be secured only through literal confrontation with the witness. The
following sections discuss alternative methods for obtaining adequate
indicia of reliability.
coached by a malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs.
Id.
115. Id. In the Court's opinion:
The rights referred to in those cases, however, were not the right narrowly and explicitly set
forth in the Clause, but rather rights that are, or were asserted to be, reasonably im-
plicit-namely, the right to cross-examine; the right to exclude out-of court statements; and
the asserted right to face-to-face confrontation at some point in the proceedings other than
the trial itself.
Id. at 2802-03 (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 2803.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987)). The Coy Court noted:
The State maintains that such necessity is established here by the statute, which creates a
legislatively imposed presumption of trauma. Our cases suggest, however, that even as to ex-
ceptions from the normal implications of the Confrontation Clause, as opposed to its most
literal application, something more than the type of generalized finding underlying such a
statute is needed when the exception is not "firmly. . .rooted in our jurisprudence."
Id.
119. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Bourjally v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 182 (1987); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
See generally Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66
N.C.L. REV. 1 (1987).
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1. Guarantees of Reliability Through Cross-Examination
A pervasive bias that children often lie about sexual abuse presents
particular problems in sexual abuse cases. 120 It is thought that forcing
them to look at the defendant during testimony will mitigate this pro-
pensity to a large degree.'
Children's testimony also is distrusted in these cases because of the
presumption that children are incompetent to testify. Recent studies,
however, show this presumption to be greatly exaggerated. 22 In fact,
children's ability to remember and recount "real life" events is quite
accurate. 23 Other studies have found no nexus between age and hon-
esty.124 More importantly, reports of sexual abuse, contrary to the con-
ventional wisdom, have proven to be approximately as credible as those
of any other crime. 25 Therefore, courts should feel confident in the reli-
ability of information elicited from minor witnesses during testimony
and cross-examination. Essentially, the testimony of children should be
regarded with the same degree of trust as that of any other witness or
crime victim.
In addition, the process of cross-examination serves to reinforce the
reliability of testimony given by child witnesses. While the Coy major-
ity cited California v. Green for the proposition that the literal right to
confront witnesses is a "core value" protected by the confrontation
clause, 26 the dissent pointed out that Green itself went on to explain
that the confrontation clause was designed to prevent the use of ex
parte affidavits, to provide for cross-examination, and to compel the
witness to stand face-to-face with the jury.127 The dissent also noted
that even if the majority believed that "something deep within human
nature" makes face-to-face confrontation essential, this was never a
part of the common-law right to confrontation. 28
Indeed, Coy is the first Supreme Court case to hold that literal con-
120. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802 (referring to child witnesses "coached by a malevolent
adult").
121. Id.
122. See Ginkowski, supra note 5, at 32.
123. See id.; see also Goldman, Studies of Children as Witnesses Find Surprising Accuracy,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1984, at C1, col. 1.
124. See Ginkowski, supra note 5, at 33; see also Melton, Children's Competency to Testify,
5 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 73 (1981).
125. See Ginkowski, supra note 5, at 33.
126. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
127. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
128. Id. Justice Blackmun stated: "'There never was at common law any recognized right to
an indispensable thing called confrontation as distinguished from cross-examination .... [Con-
frontation is] not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him,'
but, rather, to allow for cross-examination." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 5 J. WIGMoRE, Evi-
DENCE § 1397, at 158 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)).
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frontation is explicit in the sixth amendment. Prior to Coy, the Court
had acknowledged only a judicial preference for face-to-face confronta-
tion. " The opportunity for cross-examination had been viewed consist-
ently as the primary right protected by the confrontation clause.3 0
Recent cases leading up to Coy had implied that cross-examination
alone satisfied the confrontation clause with no need for physical
confrontation."3 '
The Iowa statute challenged in Coy, as well as the other child
shield laws,"3 2 provided for cross-examination in which the defendant
could fully participate, either through personal attendance or through
counsel. Moreover, it met what the Court has previously recognized as
"'the purposes of confrontation.' "I" In Coy the child victims' testi-
mony had been given under oath, subjected to unrestricted cross-exami-
nation, and the judge and jury had been able to observe their demeanor
during testimony. 3 4 Under the interpretation of the confrontation
clause in all cases prior to Coy, it is difficult to see how the right to
confrontation, and its attendant indicia of reliability, is meaningfully
impaired when the procedure preserves completely the defendant's
right to cross-examine witnesses.
13 5
2. Guarantees of Reliability Through Hearsay Exceptions
In holding that the legislative presumption of trauma was not
firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence to warrant an exception to
face-to-face confrontation,' the Coy Court implicitly rejected the hear-
say exception of psychological unavailability. 37 The requirement that
an exception to the confrontation clause be firmly rooted in our juris-
prudence, however, has been imposed in the past only when there was a
129. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original); see also
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980); Cham-
bers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
130. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
418 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965).
131. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987); Douglas, 380 U.S. at 418; see
also Recent Development, supra note 2, at 223.
132. See supra note 75.
133. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 158 (1970)); see Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986); see also supra note 34 and accompa-
nying text.
134. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
135. Cf. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that the right to
confrontation was violated when the defendant was denied active participation in the cross-exami-
nation process).
136. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
137. See id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the case does not employ a literal




question as to the reliability of an out of court statement. 38
Bourjaily v. United States reaffirmed the rule that when hearsay
falls within an established exception, no further proof of reliability is
required. 3 9 In cases such as Coy, which utilize statutory procedures
guaranteeing reliability through cross-examination, 40 no case-by-case
determination of reliability is needed. The procedures themselves cre-
ate the requisite indicia of reliability that are guaranteed by firmly es-
tablished hearsay exceptions.
Moreover, state statutes for child victim hearsay generally require
the court to make the same ad hoc determination of trustworthiness
required by the confrontation clause. 141 Such decisions turn on the facts
of the case and surrounding circumstances. 142 These statutory require-
ments for hearsay admission are supported by the statement in Dutton
v. Evans 43 that the confrontation clause would be satisfied if the court
had an adequate basis for determining the truth of the out of court
statement. 4 4 Dutton indicated that the most important factors for es-
tablishing the truth of a hearsay statement are its probative value, cer-
tainty that the statement was made, and indicia of reliability.
14 5
In addition to general guarantees of reliability, courts utilizing the
hearsay exception for psychological unavailability generally are re-
quired by statute to make a determination of any mental or physical
harm that will result if the child is required to testify in open court.16
When the traditional guarantees of reliability built into hearsay excep-
tions are merged with individualized determinations of trauma, the
guarantees of the confrontation clause are firmly in place. 47 If properly
applied, the psychological unavailability exception poses no greater
threat to the truth-seeking purpose of the confrontation clause than
138. Id. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-84
(1987); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
139. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183-84; see also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400
(1986). See generally Jonakait, supra note 49, at 571-74.
140. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
141. See generally Graham, supra note 45, at 531-37. In applying the residual hearsay excep-
tions, courts consider whether the evidence sought to be admitted demonstrates guarantees of
trustworthiness equivalent to those of statements admitted under other hearsay exceptions, is of-
fered as evidence of a material fact, is more probative than other evidence which could reasonably
be obtained, is in accord with the general purposes of the rules of evidence, and whether the pro-
ponent of the hearsay has given adequate notice.
142. See id. Some of the relevant circumstances are corroborating facts such as physical evi-
dence, inconsistent facts, and the assessed credibility of the declarant, as well as factors examined
under the residual hearsay rule that reduce the likelihood of fabrication. See supra note 141.
143. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
144. Id. at 89.
145. Id. at 88-89.
146. See Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at la-18a; Graham, supra note 45, at 558-59.
147. Contra Graham, supra note 45, at 567.
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any other hearsay exception.
B. State Interests
The Supreme Court consistently has acknowledged that the right
to confrontation is not absolute'48 and that the preference for face-to-
face confrontation 4 9 may be overcome by compelling competing inter-
ests.150 If it is necessary to further an important public policy, face-to-
face confrontation may be substituted with some other equally effective
means of ascertaining the truth.
15
Proponents of child shield laws argue that the states have a com-
pelling interest in the protection of child witnesses in sexual abuse tri-
als that is sufficient to justify modified procedures. 52 In addition to
many psychological professionals and judicial officers, at least four Jus-
tices in Coy recognized the protection of child witnesses as an impor-
tant public policy. 5 3 While the Court noted that constitutional
protections have costs, 54 two Justices concurred separately to under-
score the need for judicial flexibility in the highly traumatic realm of
testimony by child sexual abuse victims. 55 They referred merely to the
stipulation of an ad hoc determination of necessity before instituting
protective procedures.'56
Substantial authority recognizes a legitimate state interest in the
use of alternative courtroom procedures for child witnesses. Both the
sheer number of sexual abuse cases1 7 and the trauma experienced by
children as they are forced to testify about sexual assaults often hamper
the efficient and effective prosecution of offenders. 58 This trauma can
not only harm the child's emotional health 1 9 but also impair the qual-
148. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
149. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
150. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980); Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295.
151. See, e.g., Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
152. See, e.g., State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (Law Div. 1984); Coyle,
Application of Confrontation Clause: A Difficult Issue in Child Abuse Cases, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2
1987, at 10; supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
153. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by White, J.); id. at 2805
(Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
154. Id. at 2802.
155. Id. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 2805. The majority opinion, in fact, may be read to imply the same standard, but
it seems potentially to require a greater degree of need than would either the concurring or the
dissenting opinion. See id. at 2803.
157. Between 1976 and 1985, the number of reported incidents of child maltreatment rose
from .67 million to over 1.9 million (11.7% of the 1985 cases alleged sexual abuse). See AM. ASS'N
FOR PROTECTING CHILDREN, supra note 3, 18.
158. See CHILD VIcTIM ISSUES, supra note 11, at 17-18.
159. See Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 9 (citing British Psychological Ass'n, The Emotional
Effects of Criminal Court Testimony on Child Sexual Assault Victims, Proceedings from the Inter-
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ity of the child's testimony.160 Some authorities have even stated that
mitigation of anxiety through protective procedures would enhance the
reliability of a child victim's testimony, thus advancing the truth-seek-
ing objective of the trial process.' 6 '
The State's right to alter criminal procedures was not challenged in
Coy. Instead, the Court sought to restrict the application of that right.
Therefore, although Coy did increase the degree of trauma necessary to
justify the use of protective procedures," 2 it did not proscribe them al-
together. Now, states may alter procedures only upon a specific finding
of debilitating trauma on a case-by-case basis.16 3
C. Preserving the Constitutionality of Child Shield Statutes
Other child shield laws have yet to be tested against this new defi-
nition of confrontation. Most existing statutes, while not necessarily re-
quiring a finding that the child is unavailable, require the court to find
that some degree of emotional trauma would result if the child were
required to testify in open court.16 4 These requirements suggest that the
ad hoc determination required by the Coy Court is already in place in
most states implementing protective measures. Thus, Coy may only
heighten the level of trauma required to justify modified measures of
confrontation.
The Court's reluctance to identify specific exceptions to its rule of
face-to-face confrontation 65 makes the impact of Coy on the future im-
plementation of these statutes somewhat speculative. The language of
the opinion, however, suggests that the case legitimately could be con-
strued to require merely particularized findings of trauma in each
case. 66 Under that interpretation, the impact of the case would be rela-
national Conference on Child Witnesses: Do the Courts Abuse Children? (in press)).
160. See State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super 411, 416, 484 A.2d 1330, 1332 (Law Div. 1984);
see also MacFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 40 U. MIAMi L. REv. 135, 136 (1985).
161. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); MacFarlane, supra note 160, at
136.
162. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803. The Court explained:
The State maintains that such necessity is established here by the statute, which creates a
legislatively imposed presumption of trauma. Our cases suggest, however, that even as to ex-
ceptions from the normal implications of the Confrontation Clause, as opposed to its most
literal application, something more than the type of generalized finding is needed when the
exception is not "firmly. . .rooted in our jurisprudence."
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987)).
163. Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. See Note, supra note 9, at 291.
165. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
166. See id. The Court explained its finding by noting, "The exception created by the Iowa
statute, which was passed in 1985, could hardly be viewed as firmly rooted. Since there have been
no individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection, the judgment
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tively slight because particularized finding requirements are already in
place in most states.16 '
Significantly, the Iowa statute is the only child shield law authoriz-
ing the use of a screen like the one employed in Coy.16 If the Court's
opinion is interpreted to prohibit only devices that block the witness's
view of the defendant at trial, many child shield laws would remain
unaffected. The majority of these laws provide for closed-circuit trans-
mission of testimony, require the child to be present for face-to-face
cross-examination, or allow these measures to be used only in pretrial
procedures.169 If courts construe Coy as requiring a child to testify in
open court before the defendant, the judge, and the jury, however, most
of these statutes necessarily would be unconstitutional.
17 0
A reasoned view of Coy argues against this result. Both the plural-
ity opinion and the concurrence merely seem to require more stringent
measures to guarantee that the protection of child witnesses does not
result in the abuse of protective procedures or unnecessary infringe-
ment of the defendant's rights to confrontation.1 1 Under this reading,
child shield legislation that provides a system to protect the defendant
against exaggerated claims of emotional trauma should be able to meet
the test of Coy.
V. CONCLUSION
The Coy interpretation that the confrontation clause guarantees
defendants a right to face-to-face confrontation expands the right as it
has existed in the past. Coy, however, does not make this right absolute
and recognizes the possibility of exceptions in the face of important
public policies. The growing number of child abuse reports and prose-
cutions has made the protection of child witnesses an increasingly im-
portant policy. Nevertheless, legislatures must be careful to guard the
constitutional rights of defendants in these cases as well as to protect
the interests of child witnesses.
The Court's decision in Coy left the constitutionality of other child
shield measures open. The case does seem to suggest, however, that
procedures sufficient to provide particularized findings of substantial
trauma in a child witness would be adequate to justify an exception to
the rule of face-to-face confrontation. Thus, future legislative efforts to
here could not be sustained by any conceivable exception." Id.
167. See Note, supra note 9, at 291.
168. See Recent Development, supra note 2, at 226.
169. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. See generally Recent Development, supra
note 2, at 226.
170. See Recent Development, supra note 2, at 226.
171. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2798.
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protect child victims of sexual abuse must attempt to provide criteria
for ad hoc determinations of psychological trauma resulting from testi-
fying in open court or face-to-face with the defendant.
Eleanor L. Owen
